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A gold virtual asset coin and an order chart illustrating API records and unlawful gains in crypto market manipulation investigations in Korea

Order Purpose, Execution Roles, API Records, and the Calculation of Unlawful Gains

Under South Korean law, a sharp rise in virtual asset prices or short-term investment returns alone do not determine whether market manipulation has occurred. The purpose of trading, order methods, discussions among those involved, and the actual execution process must be examined together. Virtual asset service providers, issuers, and trading operators, as well as those who provide accounts or API keys, need to explain the scope of their authority and involvement using objective records.

1. Criteria for Distinguishing Ordinary Investment from Market Manipulation

Article 10(2) of the Act on the Protection of Virtual Asset Users prohibits matched orders, wash trades, and similar conduct intended to create a false impression of active trading or cause others to make erroneous judgments. Paragraph (3) of the same Article prohibits trades that create a misleading impression of active trading or change or fix prices for the purpose of inducing trading, as well as entrusting or accepting instructions for such trades.

The starting point for review is therefore the purpose of orders and how they were executed, rather than trading volume or the amount of profit itself. A distinction must be made between investment based on publicly available information and price movements and trading involving prior discussions with others about target prices, order timing, or the disposal of holdings.

Buying in pursuit of a price rally calls for a different analytical approach from accumulating holdings in advance, placing orders to induce other investors to buy, and then disposing of those holdings. However, the timing of a purchase alone cannot determine the conclusion. Communications before and after orders, recurring trading patterns, and changes in holdings must be compared together. The fact that trades were actually executed does not, by itself, rule out illegality.

2. Comparison of Order, Execution, and Cancellation Records

On September 23, 2026, the Financial Services Commission announced criminal complaints and referrals to investigative authorities concerning four cases: three cases of ultra-short-term market manipulation using APIs and other means, and one case of fraudulent trading and market manipulation involving executives and employees of a virtual asset operator. These included combinations of automated trading and manually placed high-priced buy orders, as well as the use of accounts in other people’s names. These measures concern suspected violations and must be distinguished from final convictions. To apply these recent cases to a particular trading structure, it is necessary to examine not only execution results but also how orders were submitted, modified, and canceled, in connection with who decided the settings.

Item for ReviewIssues to Distinguish and VerifyRecords for Comparison
Concentration of high-priced buy ordersQuotes and liquidity at the time, reasons for the orders, and recurring patternsOrder times, prices, quantities, and market data
Similar orders across multiple accountsIndependent decision-making versus prior discussions or joint operationCommunication times, access records, and orders by account
Large orders followed by cancellationIntent to execute when placing orders, circumstances of cancellation, and recurring patternsUnexecuted order and cancellation records, and program settings
Sales following an increase in trading volumeConnections among prior accumulation, price formation, and disposal of holdingsHoldings balances and order, execution, and settlement records
Automated trading programsParties responsible for setting and changing parameters and operating the programsSetting change histories, execution logs, and work instructions

The mere fact that orders were submitted at the same time from multiple accounts does not establish prior collusion. Communications before the orders, who decided the parameters, and how trades in each account interacted must be examined. Conversely, obtaining only exchange execution histories may omit canceled orders. Where the circumstances of cancellation are at issue, original order records and program logs should therefore both be preserved.

3. Role-Based Liability of Account Providers, Order Executors, and Trading Operators

Where the account holder and the actual operator differ, the issue is not only who executed the orders but also what role each person undertook with knowledge of the trading plan. If the provision or lending of API keys is used for unfair trading, account holders may also incur civil or criminal liability, including liability as accomplices, depending on their involvement. However, the mere fact of provision does not establish identical liability for all account holders.

Knowledge and Authority of Account and API Key Providers

The purpose of use explained by the other party, the access and trading permissions provided, any compensation for use, and whether profits were shared must be checked. The time of provision should be distinguished from the timing of the orders at issue, and records of the account holder checking trading histories or participating in operations should be organized. If the account holder’s and operator’s explanations differ, access records and communications need to be compared.

Scope of Involvement of Those Executing Orders on Instructions

It is necessary to examine who determined the asset, price, quantity, and timing, and how the person executing the orders understood the purpose of the trades. Whether there was fixed remuneration or profit sharing must also be checked. Linking the timing of work instructions to order submission times can clarify the actual role more concretely than explanations of job titles or employment relationships.

Consistency Between Liquidity Provision or Market-Making (MM) Contracts and Actual Operations

The name of a contract alone does not guarantee legality. Requirements concerning trading volume and prices, order parameters, account management, and reporting and settlement records must be examined. Work instructions and program setting change histories should be reviewed alongside the contract to identify who actually made order decisions.

4. Review of Unlawful Gains Calculations and Sanction Levels

The scope of calculation for overall investment gains and losses may differ from that for gains obtained through a violation. Losses in other assets or during a separate period do not, by themselves, eliminate the gains from the violation at issue. Article 19 of the same Act includes unrealized gains in gains obtained through a violation and delegates the detailed calculation method to Presidential Decree. Paragraph (6) of the same Article uses the difference between total revenue and total costs from transactions constituting the violation as the basis. The overall account rate of return must therefore be distinguished from the scope of the statutory gains calculation.

When calculation materials are presented, the assets, accounts, and periods covered, the relevant costs, and how remaining holdings are reflected must be checked. Even if the account as a whole shows a loss, gains may be calculated from the transactions at issue in a particular asset. Conversely, it is also necessary to examine whether facts concerning the covered transactions or costs have been reflected incorrectly.

The basic statutory penalty for market manipulation is imprisonment for a fixed term of at least one year or a fine of at least three and no more than five times the gains obtained or losses avoided through the violation. If there are no gains, if they are difficult to calculate, or if five times the gains or losses avoided is KRW 500 million or less, the maximum fine is KRW 500 million. A fine may also be imposed together with imprisonment.

If the gains or losses avoided are at least KRW 500 million but less than KRW 5 billion, the penalty is increased to imprisonment for a fixed term of at least three years. If they are KRW 5 billion or more, the penalty is increased to life imprisonment or imprisonment for at least five years. Administrative monetary penalties under Article 17 must also be examined separately, so the response should distinguish whether the alleged violation is established from the calculation of gains, and criminal punishment from administrative sanctions. The administrative monetary penalty is no more than twice the gains or losses avoided; if there are no such gains or losses avoided, or they are difficult to calculate, it is no more than KRW 4 billion. There are also provisions for adjustments in relation to fines and other sanctions for the same violation. The two sanctions should therefore neither be mechanically added together nor understood as subject to automatic exemption.

5. Preservation of Records and Preparation of Explanations After Contact Regarding an Investigation

First, distinguish an exchange’s own request for an explanation from an investigation by financial authorities or a request to appear before investigative authorities. The requesting institution and person in charge, your status, deadlines for submission or appearance, and the assets and trading periods covered must be confirmed. An exchange’s request for an explanation alone does not establish that a criminal case has been opened. However, explanations should be consistent with the records, taking into account the possibility of an external investigation.

Record collection should focus on order, execution, and cancellation records for the relevant period and original communications, rather than profit screenshots or selected captures of conversations. For API trading, parameter values and change histories, execution logs, access permissions, and operating records should also be checked. Original communications and program records must be preserved without deletion or alteration.

Explanatory materials should be organized in the following sequence: how trading began, when contact was made with those involved, how order parameters were determined and changed, and how holdings were disposed of and settlements made. Facts personally verified must be distinguished from information received from others, and gaps in memory should not be filled with speculation. A process is needed to check that explanations submitted are consistent with the original records.

6. Management Implications for Companies and Trading Operators

When a company outsources liquidity provision or trading operations, it needs to verify, separately from entering into the contract, who actually has order decision-making authority, API access permissions, and authority to change settings, as well as the reporting and settlement systems. Records should be used to check how instructions concerning trading volume and prices are communicated and reflected in actual orders.

In responding to an investigation, it is important to explain the scope of the orders at issue and who actually decided and executed them by linking these matters to trading records. Contract, instruction, access, order, and settlement records should be compared chronologically, together with a review of the scope of the unlawful gains calculation, to assess roles and responsibilities concretely.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Does Buying the Same Coin Together with Others Constitute Market Manipulation?

The mere fact of purchasing the same asset does not determine the conclusion. It is necessary to examine whether there was an agreement to coordinate purchase and sale times and prices, whether a plan to move trading volume or prices was shared, and how actual orders were connected to that plan.

What Should I Prepare if an External Provider Supplied the Automated Trading Program?

The contract, descriptions of functionality, parameter values and change histories, and communications with the operator should be secured. The provider’s default functionality should be distinguished from conditions set by the user, and the settings that generated the orders at issue must be identified.

What Rules Apply to Trading That Began Before the Act Took Effect?

The Act on the Protection of Virtual Asset Users initially took effect on July 19, 2024. Trades before and after that date must be separated, and the laws applicable at the time of each act must be checked. The possible application of other laws to trades before that date must also be reviewed separately.

Official Sources and References

National Law Information Center · Act on the Protection of Virtual Asset Users, Article 10

National Law Information Center · Act on the Protection of Virtual Asset Users, Article 17

National Law Information Center · Act on the Protection of Virtual Asset Users, Article 19

Financial Services Commission · Criminal Complaints and Referrals to Investigative Authorities Concerning Suspected Unfair Trading in the Virtual Asset Market (September 23, 2026)

Financial Services Commission · Referral of Suspected Virtual Asset Market Manipulation to Investigative Authorities and Precautions on Providing or Lending API Keys (April 29, 2026)

National Law Information Center · Act on the Protection of Virtual Asset Users: Main Text and Addenda (Including the Initial Effective Date in Article 1 of the Original Addenda)