We Resolve Legal Matters
How can we assist you?
Blogs
More-
Involved in a USDT Exchange Transaction in Korea?
Legal Risks of Crypto OTC Transactions, Money Laundering Allegations, and Accomplice Liability Some individuals become involved in USDT (Tether) exchange transactions in Korea believing they are simply helping with a private crypto transfer or OTC deal, only to later find themselves under investigation for fraud, money laundering, or violations of Korean financial regulations. In recent years, Korean investigative authorities have increasingly focused on crypto-based money laundering structures connected to voice phishing, investment scams, illegal gambling operations, and overseas criminal organizations. As a result, even participants who were not part of the original scam may become subject to criminal investigation if they are found to have handled, converted, or transferred suspicious funds. This article explains the key Korean laws, court precedents, and investigative standards commonly applied in USDT exchange cases involving alleged accomplice liability or concealment of criminal proceeds. Why USDT Is Frequently Used in Money Laundering Schemes USDT (Tether) is a stablecoin pegged to the U.S. dollar and is widely used because of its relatively stable value and fast cross-border transfer capability. However, these same characteristics also make USDT attractive to criminal organizations seeking to move or conceal illegally obtained funds. In Korea, investigative authorities have recently uncovered multiple cases where proceeds from voice phishing or investment fraud were converted into USDT and transferred to overseas wallets or cash-out channels. In March 2026, for example, Seoul Jungnang Police announced the arrest of 19 individuals involved in laundering fraud proceeds through USDT conversion schemes linked to overseas criminal groups, with approximately KRW 6 billion in criminal assets seized. Under Korea’s Act on Reporting and Use of Certain Financial Transaction Information (commonly referred to as the “Special Financial Transactions Act” or “Special Act”), anti-money laundering obligations primarily apply to registered Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs). As a result, OTC crypto transactions conducted privately between individuals often become a gray area where the participant’s knowledge and intent become the central legal issue. Major Korean Laws That May Apply 1) Fraud Accomplice Liability Under the Korean Criminal Act If a person is found to have participated in the movement, exchange, or delivery of funds obtained through fraud, Korean prosecutors may investigate whether that person acted as: a joint principal offender (co-principal), or an aider and abettor (accessory) under Articles 30 and 32 of the Korean Criminal Act. The key issue is whether the participant knowingly assisted the fraudulent scheme or merely engaged in what appeared to be an ordinary transaction. 2) Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment One of the most commonly applied statutes in these cases is Korea’s Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment. The law criminalizes conduct such as: disguising the acquisition or disposition of criminal proceeds, concealing the origin of criminal proceeds, or hiding or transferring criminal assets. In practice, converting fraud proceeds into cryptocurrency, cashing out USDT, or transferring funds through third-party wallets may all be viewed by investigators as potential money laundering activity. The central legal question is usually whether the person handling the transaction knew — or at least should have suspected — that the funds were connected to criminal activity. 3) Korean Special Financial Transactions Act (Crypto Business Registration Issues) Individuals who repeatedly exchange USDT or conduct OTC crypto transactions for commission-based profit may also face allegations of operating an unregistered virtual asset business. Korean authorities generally look at factors such as: repeated or continuous transactions, receipt of commissions or service fees, dealing with multiple counterparties, and operation resembling a commercial exchange service. A one-time transaction between acquaintances is treated differently from ongoing exchange activity conducted for profit. 4) Foreign Exchange Transactions Act In some cases, Korea’s Foreign Exchange Transactions Act may also become relevant. This typically arises where funds are transferred internationally, including situations involving overseas wallets, offshore entities, or cross-border settlement structures. If the transaction occurred solely between domestic parties using Korean won, investigators may focus more heavily on money laundering or crypto regulatory issues rather than foreign exchange violations. However, international transfer structures may trigger additional scrutiny. The Most Important Legal Issue: “Willful Blindness” or Implied Criminal Intent One of the most important legal concepts in these investigations is whether the participant had criminal intent — including so-called “willful blindness” or implied awareness. The Korean Supreme Court has ruled as follows: To punish a person for concealing criminal proceeds, it is sufficient that the person recognized the property as criminal proceeds in general terms; it is not necessary for the person to know the exact type or details of the underlying crime. — Korean Supreme Court Decision 2006Do5288, Jan. 11, 2007 This means that even if someone claims: “I did not know it was voice phishing money,” or “I thought it was related to tax avoidance or gambling,” criminal liability may still arise if the person recognized that the funds were likely illegal in some form. Importantly, Korean courts may separately recognize liability for concealing criminal proceeds even where accomplice liability for the original fraud itself is disputed. The two offenses are legally distinct. Factors Korean Investigators Commonly Use to Infer Criminal Awareness Investigative authorities do not rely solely on direct admissions. Instead, they often infer intent based on the overall transaction structure. Common factors include: ▪️Unofficial OTC Transaction Methods Transactions conducted outside registered exchanges or through private channels are often viewed as higher-risk structures. ▪️Repeated Transactions Repeated dealings using similar methods may be interpreted as evidence that the participant understood the suspicious nature of the activity. This may also support allegations of operating an unregistered crypto business. ▪️Excessive Commissions or Fees Receiving unusually high compensation compared to ordinary exchange fees may be treated as evidence of awareness of illegal risk. ▪️Lack of Identity Verification Transactions involving anonymous parties, unverifiable identities, or disappearing counterparties may raise additional suspicion. ▪️Blockchain Transaction Analysis Because cryptocurrency transfers are recorded on the blockchain, Korean authorities increasingly use blockchain forensic analysis to trace fund flows and identify links between victim funds and crypto wallets. Where several of these factors appear together, prosecutors may argue that the participant at least “implicitly recognized” the illegal nature of the funds. Defense Strategy: Explaining Why Criminal Awareness Did Not Exist In these cases, simply stating “I did not know” is rarely enough. Because Korean courts broadly recognize implied criminal intent, the defense must often demonstrate — through objective facts and evidence — why the person could not reasonably have recognized the funds as criminal proceeds. Important factors may include: how the relationship with the counterparty developed, why the transaction appeared legitimate at the time, whether there were objective warning signs, how the transaction was explained to the participant, and whether statements remain consistent with blockchain records and messaging history. Early-stage responses are particularly important because investigators often already possess substantial transaction data before conducting interviews. An inconsistent or poorly prepared initial statement may later be used to strengthen suspicions. In addition, allegations involving fraud accomplice liability, criminal proceeds concealment, crypto business registration issues, and foreign exchange violations each involve different legal elements. Identifying the actual scope of potential liability at an early stage is therefore critical. Decent Law Firm | Digital Asset & Crypto Investigation Team USDT-related investigations in Korea often involve complex issues extending beyond ordinary crypto transactions, including blockchain tracing analysis, accomplice liability, money laundering regulations, crypto compliance obligations, and foreign exchange law. At Decent Law Firm, our digital asset and crypto investigation team has experience handling cryptocurrency-related investigations from the initial investigation stage through criminal trial proceedings. If you have been contacted by Korean investigative authorities or are unsure about the allegations being raised, careful early-stage legal review is strongly recommended. This article is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice for any specific case.
-
Foreign Exchange Transactions Act Investigations in Korea: What to Do If You Are Linked to Crypto-Based Illegal Remittance or OTC Currency Exchange
Many people become involved in foreign exchange investigations without realizing the legal risks in advance. What began as a simple request to exchange money, send funds overseas, or trade USDT through a Telegram OTC channel can quickly escalate into an investigation involving Korea’s Foreign Exchange Transactions Act, AML regulations, or the Special Financial Transactions Act. In recent years, Korean authorities have significantly strengthened enforcement against crypto-based illegal remittance schemes, particularly those involving OTC brokers, P2P transfers, and unregistered foreign exchange operations. Why Crypto P2P and OTC Transactions Can Become a Legal Issue in Korea The use of crypto assets such as USDT (Tether) for cross-border payments and private currency exchange transactions has rapidly increased. Common examples include: Sending overseas tuition or living expenses through unofficial crypto channels Receiving local currency abroad after transferring crypto domestically P2P USDT trading arranged through Telegram or KakaoTalk open chat rooms OTC transactions designed to avoid banking procedures or remittance restrictions Not every crypto P2P transaction is automatically illegal. However, Korean authorities may view the activity as a violation of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act when certain factors are present. 1. Repetitive or Business-Like Activity Repeated transactions, exchange commissions, or ongoing OTC activity may be interpreted as operating an unregistered foreign exchange business. 2. Use of Unregistered Exchange Channels Trading crypto through unlicensed OTC brokers or informal exchange operators creates substantial legal risk under Korean financial regulations. 3. Involvement in “Hwanchigi” (Illegal Remittance Networks) Korean investigators closely monitor schemes that bypass formal banking systems to move funds across borders. Even users — not only operators — may become subjects of investigation if authorities believe they knowingly participated in the structure. Korean courts often distinguish sharply between one-time private transfers and repeated commercial-style exchange activity. Why Enforcement Has Become Much Stronger Recently Crypto-related financial investigations in Korea have intensified due to stricter AML and virtual asset regulations. 1. Expanded Travel Rule Requirements Recent amendments to Korea’s AML framework strengthened obligations to record and share sender/receiver information for virtual asset transfers. As compliance requirements expand, transaction tracing has become significantly easier for authorities and exchanges. 2. Exchange Monitoring Systems (FDS) Korean crypto exchanges now operate advanced Fraud Detection Systems (FDS) that actively monitor: Repeated deposits and withdrawals Suspicious OTC patterns Linked account activity Abnormal transaction flows Cross-border fund movement indicators Suspicious activity may be reported to the FIU or investigative agencies. 3. Blockchain Tracking and Wallet Analysis Once investigators identify a wallet connected to an illegal exchange operation, blockchain analytics tools can trace connected wallets and transaction histories across multiple users. Transactions once believed to be “anonymous” are now frequently traceable through on-chain analysis. Can You Be Punished Even If You Did Not Know It Was Illegal? Possibly, yes. Under Korean law, simply claiming that you “did not know” the activity was illegal does not automatically eliminate criminal liability. Investigators and courts may still recognize “willful blindness” or implied awareness in situations such as: Using unofficial financial channels despite recognizing they were not normal banking services Accepting unusually favorable exchange rates or fees Repeated or high-volume transactions Failing to verify the identity or legitimacy of the OTC counterparty Transactions involving unregistered Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) may also trigger AML concerns, suspicious transaction reporting obligations, or money laundering scrutiny. Ultimately, whether criminal liability exists depends on factors such as: Transaction frequency Transaction size Level of awareness Degree of participation Relationship with the operator or intermediary What To Do If Korean Investigators Contact You In crypto-related foreign exchange investigations, the initial response can significantly affect the outcome of the case. ✔️ Respond Carefully to Voluntary Submission Requests or Search Warrants Before voluntarily submitting phones, wallets, transaction records, or chat logs, it is important to understand the scope and legal implications of the request. If a search and seizure occurs, individuals should consider: Securing a copy of the warrant Confirming the scope of seizure Recording on-site procedures where legally appropriate Requesting legal counsel participation ✔️ Prepare Statements Carefully Unprepared explanations such as: “A friend told me to do it” “I did not know it was illegal” “I was only helping someone exchange money” may later be interpreted unfavorably. The transaction background, purpose, and level of awareness should be organized carefully with supporting records before making detailed statements. ✔️ Preserve Transaction Records Important evidence may include: Exchange deposit/withdrawal history Bank transfer records Telegram or KakaoTalk conversations Wallet addresses and TxIDs Overseas remittance requests Early evidence preservation often becomes critical in crypto-related investigations. ✔️ Review Your Legal Position Liability differs substantially depending on whether the person is viewed as: A simple user A repeated participant A broker or intermediary An operator of the exchange structure The distinction between passive use and active participation is often one of the key legal issues in Korean investigations. Early Legal Response Matters in Korea Crypto OTC and Illegal Remittance Cases Korean authorities are aggressively investigating crypto-based illegal remittance, OTC exchange activity, and unregistered foreign exchange operations. As AML regulations, Travel Rule enforcement, and blockchain tracing systems continue to expand, the likelihood of detection has increased significantly. Whether a transaction violates Korean law depends on multiple factors, including intent, structure, frequency, and transaction purpose. Early responses — especially regarding statements and evidence submission — can strongly influence the direction of the investigation. Decent Law Firm advises clients on crypto-related criminal investigations, Foreign Exchange Transactions Act matters, AML compliance issues, and virtual asset regulatory risks in Korea.
-
2026 AML Reform in Korea: 3 Key Anti-Money Laundering Obligations Under the Revised FSCMA
The amended Korean Anti-Money Laundering law is no longer just a compliance issue for banks. It is rapidly becoming a core operational and governance issue for virtual asset businesses, fintech companies, and even certain professional service providers. The revised Act on Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction Information (commonly referred to as Korea’s AML law or “Special Financial Transactions Act”) was promulgated on February 19, 2026, and is scheduled to take effect on August 20, 2026. The amendments significantly strengthen AML obligations for Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) and expand the overall compliance framework surrounding crypto-related transactions in Korea. This article outlines the three most important AML changes businesses should understand before the new rules take effect. What Is Korea’s “Special Financial Transactions Act” (특금법)? Korea’s AML framework is governed by the Act on Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction Information, which establishes reporting, monitoring, and internal control obligations designed to prevent: Money laundering Terrorist financing Illicit use of financial systems Under this framework, financial institutions and VASPs must identify suspicious transactions, verify customer information, maintain records, and implement internal AML controls. In practical terms, the law is designed to prevent criminal proceeds from entering or moving through the Korean financial system. 1. Stronger KYC and Transaction Monitoring Requirements The first major change is the expansion of customer due diligence and risk-based monitoring obligations. Under the revised rules, financial institutions and VASPs will be expected to verify not only customer identity, but also: Source of funds Purpose of transactions Beneficial ownership (BO) Ongoing transaction behavior and risk profile Electronic KYC (e-KYC), non-face-to-face identity verification, and real-time suspicious transaction detection systems are becoming effectively mandatory operational standards. The revised framework also strengthens the Risk-Based Approach (RBA) and Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) requirements for high-risk customers and transactions. In other words, AML compliance in Korea is moving away from a simple “ID verification” model toward a continuous risk management model. For crypto exchanges and fintech operators, this means AML systems must function as active monitoring infrastructure rather than passive onboarding procedures. 2. Expanded Reporting Obligations and Stronger Travel Rule Enforcement The second major reform focuses directly on virtual asset transactions. Stricter Entry Requirements for VASPs Korean regulators are strengthening licensing and registration standards for virtual asset businesses. Proposed measures include enhanced screening of: Major shareholders Executives and management personnel Financial soundness and governance structures The regulatory approach increasingly resembles traditional financial institution supervision. Expanded Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Proposed amendments to the enforcement decree and supervisory regulations would effectively require mandatory suspicious transaction reporting (STR) for certain virtual asset transactions exceeding KRW 10 million. The final regulations are expected to be confirmed around July 2026. Expansion of the Travel Rule Korea is also moving toward broader implementation of the Travel Rule. The proposed changes would: Expand sender/recipient information transmission requirements Increase the scope of covered transactions Impose additional verification obligations on receiving VASPs For VASPs operating in Korea, AML obligations are no longer limited to registration requirements. They are becoming a central factor affecting operational design, transaction processing, onboarding policies, and even fee structures. 3. Broader AML Accountability and Expansion to Professional Service Providers The third major reform concerns governance, accountability, and expansion of regulated entities. AML Officers Elevated to Executive-Level Responsibility Korean regulators are pushing to formalize AML reporting officers as executive-level positions. This means boards of directors and senior management will be expected to assume direct responsibility for AML governance and oversight. AML compliance is increasingly treated as a corporate governance issue rather than merely an internal compliance function. Formalization of AML Compliance Evaluations The amendments would also codify AML system evaluations into law. Participation in regulatory AML assessments may become mandatory, and penalties are expected for: Refusing to submit materials Providing false information Obstructing regulatory reviews Expansion to DNFBPs Korea is also formally considering AML obligations for Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), including: Lawyers Accountants Tax advisors The government has indicated that further amendments aligned with FATF standards are under discussion for 2026. This signals a broader regulatory trend: AML obligations are expanding beyond banks and crypto exchanges into the wider professional services ecosystem. What Should Companies Prepare Before August 20, 2026? With the revised law taking effect on August 20, 2026, companies have limited time to review and upgrade their AML frameworks. Financial institutions, fintech operators, and VASPs should now assess: Internal AML policies and procedures KYC and monitoring systems Transaction screening capabilities Governance and reporting structures Travel Rule compliance processes Risk-based customer classification systems For many businesses, the real legal risk will not come from the existence of AML obligations themselves, but from failing to implement operational systems that regulators consider “effective” in practice. If your company is preparing for Korean AML compliance, virtual asset regulation, or VASP-related legal risk management, the Virtual Asset Team at Decent Law Firm can assist with regulatory analysis, compliance structuring, and AML framework reviews.
-
Criminal Liability for Crypto OTC Transactions in Korea: Proceeds of Crime Concealment & Defense Strategy
“I just sold crypto and received cash.” In practice, this explanation is no longer sufficient to avoid criminal liability in Korea. According to data released by the Korea Customs Service and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in February 2026, illegal foreign exchange transactions (“hwanchigi”) over the past five years reached KRW 11.5 trillion, with approximately 83% (KRW 9.5 trillion) involving virtual assets. In 2025 alone, suspicious transaction reports (STRs) related to money laundering hit a record high of 1.3 million cases, increasing by 300,000 compared to the previous year. A pending 2026 amendment to Korea’s Anti-Money Laundering regime is expected to expand the Travel Rule to transactions under KRW 1 million and grant the FIU authority to freeze suspicious accounts. Even small OTC crypto transactions are now actively monitored and traceable. 1. How the Act on Concealment of Criminal Proceeds Applies to Crypto OTC Transactions In practice, prosecutions typically arise through the following structures: ▪ Receiving USDT from non-residents and paying KRW domestically This structure may trigger both violations of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act and the Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment. Even if it appears to be a simple exchange service, it can be treated as illegal remittance or money laundering. ▪ “Lack of knowledge” is not always a valid defense Even if the party claims they did not know the counterparty was involved in criminal activity, courts may infer knowledge based on transaction size, frequency, and the use of cash. Korean courts increasingly apply a “should have known” standard based on objective circumstances. ▪ Even intermediary roles can lead to criminal liability Individuals who only handled KRW transfers—without directly trading crypto—have been convicted as accomplices if their actions contributed to the concealment or transfer of criminal proceeds. The key issue is not the form of the transaction, but the overall structure and role within the flow of funds. 2. Penalties — Multiple Laws Apply Simultaneously Crypto OTC cases in Korea rarely involve a single charge. The following statutes are often applied in parallel: ▪ Unregistered Virtual Asset Business (VASP) – Act on Reporting and Use of Certain Financial Transaction Information → Up to 5 years imprisonment or a fine up to KRW 50 million ▪ Acquisition, possession, or disposal of criminal proceeds – Act on Concealment of Criminal Proceeds → Up to 5 years imprisonment or a fine up to KRW 30 million ▪ Unreported foreign exchange transactions – Foreign Exchange Transactions Act → Up to 3 years imprisonment or a fine up to KRW 300 million ▪ Confiscation and forfeiture → Full confiscation or preservation of assets related to criminal proceeds Because these laws can be applied cumulatively, underestimating exposure based on a single charge can lead to serious misjudgment of legal risk. 3. Real Case — KRW 580 Billion OTC Operation Leading to Indictment In a recent case, the operator of an unregistered crypto OTC business was indicted and detained for transactions totaling approximately KRW 580 billion. The case involved the laundering of KRW 23.5 billion in proceeds from crypto fraud, which were used to purchase real estate under borrowed names. Authorities imposed asset preservation measures to secure confiscation. Notably, individuals who did not directly commit fraud but participated in the money flow structure were also prosecuted. The argument that “I only facilitated transfers” was rejected by the court. 4. Defense Strategy — Varies by Investigation Stage Early response is critical in these cases, and the strategy must be tailored to each stage: ▪ Account Freeze Stage Immediate legal review is required to assess grounds for lifting the freeze and limiting asset preservation. Delays can significantly expand the scope of frozen assets. ▪ Summons (Witness/Suspect Stage) Attending an interview alone and providing unstructured answers is highly risky. Statements should be prepared in advance with counsel, focusing on transaction details and knowledge of fund origins. ▪ Submission of Transaction Records Submitting records without legal review may expose unnecessary risks. The scope, format, and explanation of submitted materials should be strategically controlled. A misstep in early statements can directly affect indictment decisions, detention, and confiscation scope. These cases often involve both administrative sanctions and criminal proceedings, requiring a dual-track defense approach. 5. Frequently Asked Questions Q. I only sold crypto and received cash. Can I still be punished? Yes. Depending on the structure, frequency, and source of funds, the transaction may be classified as illegal remittance or money laundering—even if it appears to be a simple sale. Q. I didn’t know the counterparty was involved in crime. Lack of knowledge is a key defense, but authorities often argue that you “should have known” based on objective circumstances. Early legal strategy is essential. Q. What should I do if my account is frozen? You should immediately review the legal basis and explore options for lifting the freeze. Timing is critical. Legal Guidance for Crypto OTC Cases in Korea If you have received notice of an account freeze or contact from an investigative authority, your initial response can significantly impact the outcome. Decent Law Firm’s Digital Asset Team has extensive experience handling crypto OTC, illegal remittance, and USDT-related money laundering cases. Our approach goes beyond criminal defense—we analyze transaction structures and fund flows to build a comprehensive strategy.
-
Crypto Trading Bots in Korea: Legal Risks Around VASP Registration and Market Manipulation
The number of operators building and running automated cryptocurrency trading services — commonly known as trading bots — is growing rapidly. What looks like a straightforward software product from the outside can carry significant legal exposure depending on how it is structured: potential classification as a Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP), market manipulation liability, and civil damages claims are all live risks. What matters is not what the technology does, but how the service operates. When Does a Trading Bot Become a VASP? Simply developing or selling an automated trading program does not automatically make an operator a VASP. However, once a service crosses certain structural thresholds, it may no longer be characterized as software provision — it may be treated as managing or transacting virtual assets on behalf of customers. The following structures are particularly high-risk: Collecting API keys from multiple customers and running strategies centrally on the operator's servers Pooling customer assets in the operator's wallet, executing trades, and settling afterward Running copy trading or arbitrage strategies across multiple accounts simultaneously and charging fees or performance-based compensation Once a service falls into this category, questions arise around VASP registration obligations, anti-money laundering (AML) compliance duties, and criminal exposure for operating without authorization. The same trading bot can lead to entirely different legal conclusions depending on how it is designed. Market Manipulation and Criminal Liability Automated trading programs are under close regulatory scrutiny precisely because of their potential use in market manipulation. Placing large volumes of orders in rapid succession and canceling them to artificially inflate trading volume, or distorting the order book to mislead investors, are among the most common problem patterns. Recent court decisions in Korea have resulted in custodial sentences for market manipulation carried out using automated trading programs. The position that "it was just the program" is no longer a viable defense. Operators should be particularly alert to marketing language. Phrases like "volume management" or "chart making" can be used as evidence of criminal intent in a market manipulation case. Civil Liability: Misrepresentation and Duty to Explain More frequent in practice than criminal or regulatory action are civil disputes. Expressions commonly used to market trading bot services — "principal guaranteed," "fixed monthly returns," "AI generates profits automatically" — can give rise to false advertising claims and breach of disclosure duty if losses occur. Disclaimers in terms of service do not provide complete protection. Where a service failure — a server outage, an API error, an abnormal order — causes customer losses, liability will turn on whether the operator exercised the standard of care expected. Broad indemnity clauses will not shield an operator from liability where negligence or misrepresentation can be established. How Decent Law Firm Can Help Decent Law Firm's digital asset team works at the intersection of technology and financial regulation. We help operators build legally sound businesses from the ground up. VASP analysis: Full review of service architecture to identify and eliminate unauthorized operation risk before it becomes a problem. Algorithm compliance review: Legal guidance on trading strategies to ensure they cannot be characterized as market manipulation. Terms of service and marketing compliance: Drafting and reviewing documentation to minimize false advertising exposure and build defensible terms for civil disputes. Running a service without legal review is unnecessary risk. If you are designing or operating a crypto trading bot service, contact Decent Law Firm's digital asset team for a clear-eyed assessment of where you stand.
-
Must-read if you want to avoid punishment for violating Korea’s Anti-Money Laundering Law
Why anti–money laundering (AML) cases become a problem The Act on Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction Information (the “Specified Financial Information Act,” often called the AML Act) is a core law aimed at preventing money laundering (AML) by regulating money-laundering activities and the financing of public-intimidation/terroristic acts through financial transactions. This law is not so much a statute that directly punishes the act of money laundering itself; rather, it focuses on regulating the financial transaction order through measures intended to prevent money laundering—such as reporting obligations for financial institutions, customer due diligence (KYC) obligations, and reporting/registration obligations for virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Because of this, cases repeatedly arise in which a person becomes a target of investigation for alleged AML law violations even though they did not directly commit a crime, simply because they failed to exercise sufficient caution regarding the source of funds or the structure of the transaction. Recently, in practice, issues often arise in situations involving virtual asset (crypto) transactions, movement of funds using corporate accounts, and intermediary/relay structures involving third parties. Even if a transaction appears normal on the surface, legal risk can arise if the origin and flow of funds are not clear. In what situations can you become implicated in a violation of the AML law? Violations of the Specified Financial Information Act are intent crimes, meaning punishment requires proof of intent. However, intent includes not only direct intent, but also dolus eventualis (reckless/conditional intent). If a person recognizes the possibility that the criminal result may occur and internally accepts that risk, intent may be found. This is determined not only by the actor’s statements, but by a comprehensive evaluation of specific circumstances, including the external form of conduct and the situation. Lending your financial account to another person or providing an access medium (e.g., authentication tools) may constitute a violation of the Electronic Financial Transactions Act (Article 49(4) of that Act). In addition, if you assist someone in conducting financial transactions under another person’s real name for the purpose of an evasive or unlawful act, you may be liable as an aider for a violation of the Act on Real Name Financial Transactions and Confidentiality (Financial Real-Name Act) (Article 6(1) and Article 3(3) of that Act). However, under the Financial Real-Name Act, an “evasive/unlawful act” must rise to a level comparable to the concealment of illegal assets, money laundering, financing of public-intimidation/terroristic acts, or evasion of compulsory execution. There is case law holding that simply being used as an account to receive fraud proceeds from electronic financial fraud is, by itself, difficult to regard as an “evasive/unlawful act” (Incheon District Court, Feb. 11, 2022, Decision 2021No3685). That said, in practice, there have been many cases where something appeared to be a normal investment settlement or payment for services, but was judged to be a channel for transferring illegal funds, triggering an investigation. In particular, when repeat transactions, large amounts, and a complex transaction structure are intertwined, criminal suspicion becomes much stronger. Key response points you must consider if you become implicated Money-laundering-related crimes punish not only principal offenders but also aiders and abettors. Therefore, even if you did not directly obtain or store criminal proceeds, you may be punished as an accomplice if you engaged in conduct that facilitated money laundering. For aiding/abetting liability to be established, the principal’s crime must satisfy the statutory elements and be unlawful, and the aider must have intent to assist along with awareness that the principal’s conduct constitutes an act meeting the elements of the offense. However, in AML cases, what matters more than whether you committed a formal act is how you were involved in the flow of funds and whether you could have recognized what was happening. In practice, factors like the following are reviewed comprehensively: Whether you committed specific acts that constitute money laundering or aiding/abetting money laundering Whether you knew, or could have known, that the funds were criminal proceeds or other illegal assets Whether your involvement was merely part of routine 업무 (work-related involvement), or whether you had an intent to facilitate money laundering In virtual asset cases, whether you fall under the Specified Financial Information Act’s definition of a “virtual asset service provider (VASP)” and whether you fulfilled the reporting/registration obligations Also, the fact that the transaction structure looked normal does not, by itself, negate legal responsibility. In areas such as virtual asset transactions, the use of corporate accounts, and third-party relay structures, the key standard is substance over form—the reality, not the appearance. Financial transactions or virtual asset transactions conducted in Korea are subject to the Specified Financial Information Act. Even if the transaction occurs overseas, it may still fall under the Act if it is conducted through Korean financial institutions or virtual asset service providers. Assistance from Descent Accordingly, Descent Law Office approaches AML cases not as a simple response to allegations, but through a structure-focused analysis. Reflecting the characteristics of virtual asset and corporate transactions, the firm reviews fund flows and each party’s role in a multidimensional way, and from the early stages of an investigation, establishes a response strategy that considers both criminal and civil risks. Based on extensive practical experience in similar cases, the firm provides realistic defense direction rather than merely formal advice. In AML matters, outcomes can vary greatly depending on the timing and manner of response, and early choices can determine the course of the case. Before it is too late, consult a professional expert first.
